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Abstract
By putting effort into behaviours like foraging or scanning for predators, an animal can improve the correctness of its
personal information about the environment. For animals living in groups, the individual can gain further information if it is
able to assess public information about the environment from other group members. Earlier work has shown that
consensus group decisions based upon the public information available within the group are more likely to be correct than
decisions based upon personal information alone, given that each individual in a group has a fixed probability of being
correct. This study develops a model where group members are able to improve their personal likelihood of making a
correct decision by conducting some level of (costly) effort. I demonstrate that there is an evolutionarily stable level of effort
for all the individuals within the group, and the effort made by an individual should decrease with increasing group size. The
relevance of these results to social decision making is discussed: in particular, these results are similar to standard theoretical
predictions about the amount of vigilance shown by individuals decreasing with increasing group size. However, this model
suggests that these results could come about where individuals are coordinating their effort within the group (unlike
standard models, which assume that all individual effort is independent of the actions of others). This ties in with
experimental findings where individuals have been shown to monitor the efforts of others.
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Introduction
All animals rely on being able to process information about the
environment to make accurate decisions about their activities, such
as where to find food, and what actions to take to avoid predators
[1]. The accuracy of the individual’s actions depends in part on
the quality of the information it possesses, and therefore the animal
should devote a significant amount of effort into sampling the
environment: this improvement in ‘personal information’ should
in turn lead to a reduction in the animal’s chances of making an
incorrect decision [2]. For animals living in groups, individuals can
benefit from the information about the environment available
from other group-members, which may be communicated
between group members, or may simply be inadvertently available
as ‘public information’ [1,3].
The availability of public information and its uses in enhancing
an individual’s knowledge of its environment is therefore a
potential benefit to the individual of associating in a group [4].
Usually, it is assumed that the group’s members are always able
to assess their environment to a set degree of certainty, and
therefore each individual’s personal information about the
environment is just as likely to be correct as that of other group
members. Following the jury theorem proposed by the Marquis
de Condorcet [5], previous models have used this assumption to
demonstrate how individual group-members could pool their
personal information, and, by following the majority decision of
the group, how each individual could increase its own chances of
making a correct decision [6–8]. These models assume that the
individuals in a group are able to signal some form of information
about the environment (such as whether food is present or absent
in a particular location, or a choice between two possible foraging
sites). If each individual has a given probability of being correct
(and is more than 50% likely to be correct), an individual
following the decision shown by the majority of the group is more
likely to be right than if it were to rely on just its own personal
information.
However, individuals don’t just receive information about
their environment passively: an individual can increase the
accuracy of its personal information by putting in some degree
of effort in sampling the environment. If individuals within a
group are able to increase their own certainty of making the
correct decision, this in turn will mean that the majority
decision of the group is more likely to be correct. Where there is
some sort of cost involved with improving personal information,
the individual therefore faces a trade-off: improving personal
information is costly, but the resulting benefits could be received
by both the individual and its fellow group-members. Because
group-members are able to benefit from the actions of each
other, there is potential for individuals to cheat, and free-load
off the effort of others. Here, I demonstrate that the
evolutionarily stable amount of effort that an individual should
put into improving its own certainty of making the correct
decision is directly linked to both the social and ecological
constraints experienced by the individual, by considering the
e f f e c t so fg r o u ps i z e ,a sw e l la st he costs and benefits associated
with improving information accuracy.
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The Condorcet model assumes that each individual possesses
and signals a personal intention about an action relating to the
environment, which has a given probability of being correct. In
this case, the intention signalled is the individual’s preferred choice
out of a mutually exclusive pair of actions (where one of the actions
is taken to be ‘correct’, and the other ‘incorrect’, e.g. deciding to
visit a patch which may or may not be empty, or being vigilant or
non-vigilant at a given level of predation risk). We assume that an
individual is able to put some effort e (where e$0) into reducing its
uncertainty in the information it possesses about which of the pair
of choices is correct: given that there is some basal accuracy b for
an individual if it puts in no effort into improving its information
(where 0#b#1), then we can write the individual’s personal
accuracy for putting effort e into improving the accuracy of the
information (such as through sampling the environment) as
Ip e ðÞ ~
bzde
1zde
, ð1Þ
where d is a scaling constant denoting the accuracy of a decision in
relation to the effort (where d.0 – it is assumed here that the
increase in accuracy will diminish as effort increases). Therefore,
the probability of the information being correct falls between b and
1 depending upon the effort put in by the individual.
Given a population where all individuals put in effort ep, the
likelihood of success when following the majority decision can be
calculated [7] using the binomial distribution for a group
consisting of n individuals:
Is e ðÞ ~
X n
k~ceil n=2 ðÞ
n
k
  
Ip e ðÞ
k 1{Ip e ðÞ
   n{k ð2Þ
where ceil(n) denotes that smallest possible integer value equal to or
greater than n (necessary when n is even to avoid ‘hung’ votes
where half of the group prefer each of the two options available).
If we assume that there is a single mutant in the group of size n
that puts in effort em, then it follows that if the mutant makes the
correct decision, the majority decision will be correct if
at least (n21)/2 of the other members of the group also
make the correct decision, which will occur with probability
P n
j~ceil n{1 ðÞ =2 ðÞ
n{1
j
  
Ip ep
   j 1{Ip ep
      n{j{1.S i m i l a r l y ,i ft h e
mutant makes the wrong decision, the majority decision will still be
c o r r e c tp r o v i d e dt h a ta tl e a s t( n+1)/2 of the other members of
the group are correct, which will occur with probability
P n
k~ceil nz1 ðÞ =2 ðÞ
n{1
k
  
Ip ep
   k 1{Ip ep
      n{k{1.I fw ed e n o t e
the probability of the mutant being correct as Ip(em), given that it
puts effort em into improving its own accuracy, then it follows that
the group’s overall likelihood of success is
I’s ep,em
  
~Ip em ðÞ
X n{1
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n{1
j
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We assume that there is a fitness cost c(e) to each individual of
putting in effort e such that c(e)=ke (where the cost scalar k is a
constant), and a fitness gain from being correct such that g(Is)=cIs
(where the gain scalar c is a constant). We also assume that there are
no costs associated with assessing the choice of action of the other
members of the group (so public information is essentially free,
which could occur if it was available as an inadvertent cue).
Assuming that other members of the group are not related to the
mutant, we can write the fitness of an mutant playing effort em within
a group where all other individuals play the population strategy ep as
we m,ep
  
~gI ’s em,ep
     
{ce m ðÞ : ð4Þ
Following standard procedures for calculating an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS – [9]), a population ESS e*e x i s t sw h e n
max
em
we m,e  ðÞ ðÞ :we  ,e  ðÞ . The best mutant effort em to a given
population effort ep is found by calculating em where hw(em,ep)/hem=0
(holding ep constant, and confirming h
2w(em,ep)/hem
2,0a n d( h
2w(em,ep)/
hemhep + h
2w(em,ep)/hem
2),0 to satisfy conditions for mutant and
population stability [10]), and solving the resulting equation for
em=ep=e*. It can be demonstrated that the equations can be solved to
give multiple solutions for e* across the real numbers, but we are only
interested in those values of e*w h e r ee*.0, w(e*,e*).0, and Ip(e*).0.5
(the accuracy of an individual playing strategy e* has to be greater than
0.5 for there to be any benefit to paying attention to a group consensus
decision). Valid solutions for multiple parameter sets were calculated
numerically – in all cases, a maximum of one existing value of e*c o u l d
be found when these constraints were applied. The effects of changing
each variable individually (keeping the other parameters constant) were
investigated in 5000 parameter sets.
Results
Changing the gain in units of fitness by increasing the scaling
constant c leads to an increase in the effort that should be
shown by individuals: if there is more to be gained from being
correct, it pays to invest more effort (figure 1A). Similarly, if we
increase the cost scalar k, the amount of effort should fall
(figure 1B).
The size of the basal degree of information correctness, b,
(where 12b represents the degree of uncertainty about the
decision being considered) affects the ESS level of effort:
increasing the probability of being correct without having to
put in any effort means that the effort made by an individual
should fall, until some intermediate value of b above which
there is no ESS effort (figure 1C) – above this, the costs
associated with any effort to increase public information will be
to high to make the effort worthwhile. Increasing the accuracy
scaling constant d leads to an increase in the amount by which
any effort decreases the uncertainty in the information, but the
effect of increasing this constant on the ESS level of effort to
put in varies, where some intermediate value of d gives a
maximal value of e* (as demonstrated in figure 1D): therefore,
increasing d c o u l dl e a dt oa ni n c r e a s eo rd e c r e a s ei ne*. Note
that figure 1D gives a case where e* is at a maximum at a low
intermediate value of d. In some parameter sets, no valid
solution exists for very small values of d. This ties in with the
fact that larger values of b may not yield a valid solution, as b is
going to be heavily influential on Ip(e) (as described in eqn. 1)
when d is small.
Group size, n, has a distinct effect upon the ESS amount of
effort shown within a population. Figure 1E demonstrates that
individual effort should decrease as group size increases. Note that
once group size has become sufficiently large, the change in ESS
effort will be vanishingly small with further increase in group size,
and we could therefore suggest that effort is essentially indepen-
dent of group size in large groups.
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The effort an individual puts into improving its information is
therefore dependent upon group size, and we would expect to see
these changes in effort in any situation where individuals are
partially relying upon other group members to process information
about the environment. This result is particularly pertinent to
studies of vigilance behaviour. Following the theoretical frame-
work proposed by Pulliam [11], standard theory predicts that
individual vigilance levels (which I am taking to be akin to effort
here) should fall with an increase in group size [12–15]. Work
related to these predictions usually run on the assumption that
scanning by individuals is an independent process, and that no
coordination is seen between the members of the group [16]. The
model I present here demonstrates, as with the earlier standard
models, effort should fall with increasing group size (figure 1E).
However, unlike previous models, the model presented here relies
upon there being some level of coordination between the
individuals. Although there is much work suggesting that vigilance
is independent, recently both theoretical [17,18] and empirical
studies of birds [19,20] and mammals [21–25] have suggested that
there may be occasions where there is some degree of coordination
in vigilance bouts: for example, individuals within multispecies
aggregations of gulls display watchfulness that is correlated with
the vigilance activity of their neighbours when resting [19]. This
means that coordination of activity may happen within vigilant
groups, where individuals are monitoring the efforts of others, and
responding to them accordingly. Therefore, the framework
presented here may give an alternative explanation for empirical
observations of vigilance.
This model suggests that as groups become very large, there is
relatively little change in the evolutionarily stable amount of effort
that an individual should invest. Therefore, for very large groups,
ecological factors such as the costs and benefits associated with
enhancing personal information will be much more important
than the exact size of the group. Note that the model assumes that
all individuals have instant access to public information. With
larger groups, this is unlikely to be practical, and consideration
needs to be given to how individuals could physically assess the
intentions of all the group’s members. In smaller groups, the exact
amount of effort to invest is much more affected by exact group
size, but in these groups, it will be much more possible to
accurately assess both the size of the group and the intentions of
the group’s members.
The results I present here require careful testing in a suitable
biological system (preferably one where the costs of information
gathering can be manipulated): a socially foraging species where
the group moves to foraging sites without single individuals taking
the lead (such as the plains zebra, Equus burchellii [26]), would be a
suitable system. Although consideration could be given to cases
where all individuals are identical in both their needs and their
decision-making processes [27,28] further consideration needs to
be given to cases where some individuals have more influence than
others [29–34]. Similarly, it is very likely that there will be
biological situations where individuals may differ in their inherent
qualities [35–38], where the group has more than two options to
choose between [39], or where there are differences in both
information accuracy and knowledge of the group consensus
between individuals [35]. Parallel work in the social sciences have
explored many different aspects of human social decision-making
in public goods games and cooperative problem-solving (e.g.
[40–42]), which could inform our understanding of biological
voting games. In particular, including a personal cost of information
acquisition in group decision-making processes in addition to the
Condorcet majority (e.g. [39,40]) could also give some interesting
new insights into the evolution of collective decision-making.
Furthermore, I only consider unrelated individuals in this
model: including the effects of relatives benefiting from an
individual’s actions could well have impacts upon the optimal
amount of effort shown, and warrants further investigation. In the
current model, individuals can suffer costs from investing effort in
improving group accuracy, but will benefit from the group being
Figure 1. Typical evolutionarily stable levels of effort for the six parameters used in the model. Default values of parameters in the
figures: c=10 units, b=0.5, d=2,n=25 and k=0.1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011705.g001
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related to them: this could be equated to human competitive
systems where group-level actions come from individuals learning
the actions of the group [41], rather than from cooperation. I have
demonstrated here that living in egalitarian groups may have large
effects upon the level of investment that individuals put into group
decision-making. This result is particularly relevant to group-living
animals that rely on a consensus or a quorum number of
individuals to make an accurate decision [6,36–38,42–44].
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